I’m neither a math geek nor a stathead and find extended discussions of statistics not especially engaging. If you feel the same, then you might actually enjoy this book.
The author writes in an easy-to-follow conversational style and as an experienced educator (in psychology and statistics) knows how to break concepts into smaller pieces to aid comprehension. He is, in addition, a published baseball stathead, someone who has done authentic research, so he comes to the subject with some authority. He’s not just Ed from Lakewood with an opinion about baseball.
Unfortunately, he appears to be one of those people who likes to discourse, and he spends quite an inordinate amount of space, perhaps as much as one third of the book, discussing his private life or relating overly long baseball anecdotes that are only loosely connected with his topics. Some readers might like this as it provides a break from the discussions on statistics and probabilities. I found it tedious and wasteful.
I don’t keep up with the latest in analytics research, but it seems most of the concepts Carleton discusses are nothing new. I’ve heard broadcasters and read reporters discussing some of these ideas, and Carleton doesn’t present any as new findings. As such, his book provides a useful overview of research from the past two decades, but is not, as the title suggests, offering a revolutionary new approach to playing or managing baseball.
Chapter 1 covers the concepts and a little of the math underlying WAR (Wins Above Replacement), now a commonly used stat for providing a snapshot of a player’s overall value (or, how well he contributes to winning games). Chapter 2 begins with a look into Expected Runs, the probability of scoring in one of baseball’s 24 possible combinations of runners and outs. This matrix can be used, for example, to evaluate sacrifice bunts, a play Carleton argues is best avoided since the result -- losing an out -- reduces run probability more than advancing a runner increases it. In this chapter Carleton also discusses how incremental changes can have large cumulative effects, illustrated with the concept of pitch framing, which some catchers have used to save up to 20 extra outs per season (the equivalent of two wins).
Chapter 3 looks into a number of instances in which managers work against their best interests. Carleton argues that third base coaches are far too conservative in sending third-base runners on outfield fly balls. Using something called a logistic regression (left unexplained), the data suggests even though in 98% of such cases the odds of scoring a run are higher than being thrown out, third base coaches are sending players only 80% of the time, costing runs and potential wins. Similarly, managers typically save their best relievers to protect a late lead, when using a leverage calculation suggests that the most dangerous situation, when the best reliever might be most effective, is a mid-to-late inning tie-game, a situation in which the best reliever is almost never called on. When it comes to stealing, data shows that managers send runners more frequently after being caught stealing. Carleton suggests managers may be trying to recover something lost or, despite the logic of probability, believe that because the last attempt was an out, the next attempt is sure to be safe.
Chapter 4 explores the concept of emergence through the task of roster building. The idea is that winning is more complicated than just having the best player at each position. Such a strategy might in fact be a sure combination for losing. The principle of diffusion (developed by psychologists studying the Genovese murder) suggests that when others are present people are less likely to act in emergencies as they believe someone else may take care of the problem. Carleton has found evidence that the best complement up the middle is an average second baseman supported by an outstanding short-stop (or vice versa). One makes the extra hustle because he knows his partner may not be able to make the play. This chapter also explores the conceptualization of pitching rotations and how the current roster system conspires against the efficient use of three-inning middle relievers.
Chapter 5 shifts to discussion of The Shift through an exploration of why David Ortiz rarely bunted. Carleton notes that the bunt is rarely used against the shift, and is becoming rarer, but is successful nearly 60% of the time it is used. So, why not bunt more often? This involves a discussion of game theory and how players anticipate and react to one another under game conditions. Carleton’s conclusion? It was in Ortiz’ interest to develop a reputation as a guy who didn’t bunt. Ideally, he could have bunted just under 10% of the time he faced the shift and counted on the opponent to continue to employ a shift. Optimally, though, Carleton argues that Ortiz should have bunted every time the opponent conceded the third base line, that the chance of a bunt hit would have added more value than swinging for a homerun. Rather ironically, the added value of bunting would come not from bunts up the line, but the hole at short when the opponent tried to take away the bunt. In closing out this chapter, Carleton looks at Expected vs. Actual Called Balls and Strikes when pitching in front of a shift (2012-2017) and finds a decline in strikes and an increase in balls, suggesting pitchers are changing strategies when pitching before a shift and thereby possibly eliminating any advantage the shift may confer.
Chapter 6 is about the many human variables the manager is required to administer and how being successful is about more than being good at calling any individual game. Chapter 7 contains a hodgepodge of interesting observations, including stats showing that batters who foul off a first pitch end up with better batting results than those who take a strike swinging or looking. The same holds for batters who foul off a two-strike pitch. In fact, the more two-strike pitches they foul off, the better their results. Regarding stealing, data shows that pick-off throws are not a deterrent and that steals are in fact more common when thrown. This could be because of runner bravado or because most pitchers know who is likely to steal and act accordingly. While pick-off throws don’t prevent steal attempts, the data shows that steals are 6% less successful when preceded by pick-off attempts. Carleton concludes the chapter with a discussion of the recent change to the intentional walk rules, arguing rather unconvincingly for the importance of the drama of four pitched balls.
Chapter 8 looks at changes in managerial perceptions on nutrition (with teams realizing that proper food for their minor league employees makes for better players), mental development (using prescription drugs to control such things as ADD and ADHD), and cultural assimilation (largely through language programs and use of bilingual staff). Chapter 9 returns to the theme of unpredictability of human behavior through discussions of the free agency market, currently undervalued in a WAR formula of $10 million per win. Carleton also looks at the draft and finds a small relationship between signing bonus and later performance, but only for those drafted in the first round. In successive rounds there is no such relationship, meaning scouts and managers are functioning at the level of random picks.
Chapter 9 explores a few baseball myths, beginning with the idea of momentum. The number of meaningful games played before the playoffs from 1995-2017, for example, exhibits no significant effect on future playoff performance. Even looking at specific pairs of games showed no discernable effect. Carleton also investigates predictors for pitching injuries and finds the strongest relationship with number of pitches thrown. Finally, there is the somewhat less well known myth of avoiding three left-handed hitters in succession at the top of the line-up. The fear is that the opponent might retaliate with a lefty reliever, a rather debilitating strategy, Carleton argues, as it gives away advantage (three best hitters in the three best slots) for a possible disadvantage that may never materialize.
Chapter 10 concludes the book with observations on the great statistical variability in baseball, suggesting why the game may be so attractive to those with a fondness for numbers and who end up calling themselves statheads. “The most commonly played game from a line-score perspective (again from 1901 to 2017) is a 1–0 game in which the home team scores the only run in the bottom of the ninth. It’s happened 296 times. It’s followed closely by a 1–0 game in which the home team scores the only run in the first inning (269 times). On the flip side, in 2017, nearly 80 percent of all games ended with line scores that had never happened before in baseball history, and not because of strange games in which teams are combining for 30 runs.”
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